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Legal intentionalism, the theory that the legal meaning of the statute book
is a function of the legislative intentions of its authors, is often contrasted
with legal literalism, which holds that a provision’s legal meaning is a
function of its literal meaning.1 Each theory purports to explain the practice
of statutory interpretation. Legal literalism’s claim to do so was famously
disputed by Lon Fuller, who argued that literal meanings can imply
outcomes which, intuitively, are legally incorrect (Fuller 1958). Scott
Soames has recently suggested that Fuller’s counter-examples also refute
primitive versions of legal intentionalism (Soames 2009). I argue, first, that
“Fuller-proofing” legal intentionalism undercuts the theory’s explanatory
ambition; second, that Fuller’s examples in fact pose no challenge to legal
intentionalists.
On Soames’ account, there are three kinds of legal cases: those that are
easy, those that are merely literally hard, and those that are genuinely hard
(ibid., 403). Literally hard cases are ones in which the legally correct
outcome is clear, but at odds with the provision’s literal meaning. Genu-
inely hard cases are those in which a provision’s “overall linguistic
content” leaves the legal question undetermined. In such cases, “every-
thing asserted and conveyed in adopting the relevant legal texts” (ibid.,
409) is insufficient to resolve the case.
In his celebrated exchange with H.L.A. Hart, Fuller stipulated a hypo-
thetical enactment, “It shall be a misdemeanor to sleep in any railway
* A version of this paper was presented at the open session of the 2010 Joint Session of the
Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, and I am grateful to Gerard Casey, Antony
Duff and Timothy Bowen for their comments on that occasion, and to John O’Dowd, Paul
Brady and Jan van Zyl Smit for their comments on earlier drafts.
1 In this context, an utterance’s “literal meaning” is the proposition generated by the symbols
in question and the appropriate community’s conventions on linguistic meaning.
Ratio Juris. Vol. 24 No. 3 September 2011 (330–4)
© 2011 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main
Street, Malden 02148, USA.
station” (Fuller 1958, 664). Fuller asks us first to consider the case of a
businessman who was waiting until 3 a.m. for a delayed train. When
arrested, the businessman was sitting upright in an orderly fashion, but was
heard by the arresting officer to be gently snoring. Second, we are to consider
a man who had brought a blanket and pillow to the station and had
obviously settled in for the night. This man was arrested before he had a
chance to go to sleep. We are supposed to agree that, intuitively, the legally
correct outcome is that the second defendant is guilty (the tramp), whereas
the first is innocent (the businessman). Fuller concluded that, since the literal
meaning of the provision entails contrary outcomes, legal literalism is shown
to be false. Soames (2009, 415–7) agrees, but believes that what was conveyed
in adopting the provision also entails the contrary outcomes.
At first glance, Soames’ concern seems misplaced. After all, Fuller
himself remarked that, “We have no trouble in perceiving the general
nature of the target toward which the statute is aimed” (Fuller 1958, 664).
We can plausibly attribute to Fuller’s lawmaker the intention that train
stations not be used as places for sleeping. The provision’s legislative intent
would then entail outcomes consistent with our intuitions. Ostensibly, legal
intentionalism has nothing to fear. Soames is unconvinced. Noting that,
“[t]here is, after all, a distinction between what one actually says in a given
context, and what one would say, if one considered things more carefully”,
Soames doubts there are “grounds for thinking that what lawmakers
actually assert in all Fuller-type cases must be nuanced enough to determine
the correct outcome in every problematic future application” (Soames 2009,
416). Accordingly he concedes that what is conveyed in adopting a
provision might entail incorrect legal outcomes.
To solve the problem, Soames complicates his initial thesis. He suggests
that lawyers conventionally prefix the operator “roughly” or “approxi-
mately” to a provision’s legal meaning. This prefix is the contribution, “of
the genre of lawmaking itself,” to what is said in the adoption of a
provision (ibid., 417). The effect is to make a provision’s legal meaning,
“somewhat indefinite, open-ended” (ibid.). Given its conventional prefix,
whatever content is conveyed by a legal provision will fail to entail
particular outcomes. Consequently, it cannot entail counter-intuitive out-
comes such as those otherwise thought to arise in Fuller-type cases. As
such, the claim that a provision’s legal meaning is determined by the
content it conveys is no longer contradicted by Fuller-type possibilities.
The difficulty with this account of legal meaning is that it overlooks the
phenomenon of legal agreement. Within any practice of statutory interpre-
tation, there are countless questions for which everyone agrees that the law
entails determinate, obvious answers. We do not consider such answers
“roughly” or “approximately” correct, or that the law leaves it somewhat
indefinite or open-ended as to the decisions to which interpreters are legally
committed. This is just the phenomenon of “easy” cases, cases for which
331A Fullerian Challenge to Legal Intentionalism?
© 2011 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Ratio Juris, Vol. 24, No. 3
statutes leave only one legally credible outcome. Contrary to Soames’ initial
taxonomy, which recognizes such cases, the prefix he claims to be conven-
tionally attributed to a provision’s legal meaning excludes their existence.
Just add a second tramp to Fuller’s hypothetical, one found fast asleep in
station, accompanied by pillows, blankets and a hot water bottle. Legal
interpreters would not consider the man’s breach of Fuller’s ordinance to be
in any way indeterminate. They would answer that his breach is emphatic.
In overlooking the phenomenon of legal agreement, Soames’ response to
Fuller-type cases leaves unexplained a key feature of our practice of
statutory interpretation. Before leaving our assessment of Soames’ retooled
legal intentionalism, we will briefly consider a possible friendly amend-
ment. Rather than pointing to a conventional prefix, Soames might instead
follow the lead of legal literalists and claim that, conceptually, the content
of a legal norm does not determine how it ought to be applied (Atria 2002;
Navarro 2001; Elkins 1999).
Drawing a distinction between a statute’s logical and legal implications,
Fernando Atria imagines a provision according to which it is prohibited to
sleep in train stations. To establish the provision’s legal implications, the
interpreter must decide how it is to be applied. There are more or less
“formalist” ways of doing so, each yielding a different legal outcome.
Should the provision be strictly applied, that is, should its logical impli-
cations be deemed its legal implications, Fuller’s businessman would be
found guilty (since he lost consciousness) and the tramp would not (since
he was still awake). Applied “less formally,” neither man would be guilty.
Applied “with a very low degree of formality,” the businessman would be
innocent but the tramp guilty. Thus, Fuller’s puzzle is solved; both liter-
alists and intentionalists can deflect Fuller-type cases by reference to the
appropriate formality with which to apply the ordinance at issue. A
provision’s legal meaning—whether determined by its literal meaning or
its legislative intent—does not itself bear legal implications. A decision on
how formally the provision ought to be applied is first required.
Unlike Soames’ suggestion, Atria’s solution is consistent with the broad
agreement on most legal questions: legal answers are not indeterminate,
simply reached by way of a two step process. On inspection, however,
drawing a distinction between a statute’s logical and legal implications
equally handicaps the attempt to explain the practice of statutory
interpretation.
What is the origin of the norms determining the formality with which
legal provisions are to be applied? Presumably, these norms of application
vary from place to place. Otherwise, it would be impossible for a provision
to prohibit loss of consciousness in train stations. That is implausible.
Conversely, if these norms are locally generated, the question is, by whom?
Perhaps they are determined by the local Constitution, or by the provisions
of an interpretation statute? Two difficulties emerge. First, whereas a
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jurisdiction may not have enacted any constitutional or statutory provision
addressing the question of how formally statutes ought to be applied, we
would not insist that the businessman’s acquittal is contingent on the prior
enactment of such a provision.2 Second, even if the first thing every
jurisdiction did was to enact such a provision, it is unclear how any such
provision could be specific enough to determine the level of formality
necessary to produce the appropriate legal implication in each of the
countless cases featuring a legally obvious outcome.
The norms determining the appropriate formality with which to apply
legal provisions might alternatively be understood as consisting of local
interpretive traditions or conventions. If, however, the aim is to explain the
practice of statutory interpretation, the question of how local legal inter-
preters come to settle upon particular conventions of application formality
will urgently arise. Moreover, the second difficulty, accounting for how so
many legal questions seem to have obvious, determinate answers, remains
as pressing. How could a jurisdiction’s interpretive conventions be so
detailed as to determine the appropriate formality with respect to every
such question? It seems that drawing a distinction between a provision’s
logical and legal implications is no more conducive to explaining legal
practice than characterizing the statute book as prefixed by a “roughly”
operator. It is time to revisit Soames’ premise that Fuller-type cases pose a
challenge to legal intentionalism.
Recall Soames’ distinction between what one actually says on a given
occasion and what one would have said on greater reflection. Soames
worried that there were bound to be occasions where what the legislature
actually said diverged from what it would have said on further consider-
ation. The worry is well-founded. It may be, however, that our legal
intuitions always favour the outcome entailed by what the legislature
actually said over any entailed by what it would have said on further
consideration. If so, the feared divergence is consistent with the claim that
the statute book’s legal meaning is a function of the (actual) legislative
intentions of its authors.
Our readiness to criticize legislators’ policy failures suggests that our
legal intuitions do indeed favour outcomes entailed by what was actually
said. We regularly disapprove of legislators’ decisions to enact particular
legal provisions. Such disapproval generally occurs when the legal impli-
cations of some provision are thought to be all too evident. A belief that
legislators would have reached a different view on a matter had they been
better informed or more reflective is consistent with treating what they
actually said as legally decisive. Legislators may themselves coherently
believe that what they said in enacting a particular law has clear, and
clearly harmful, legal implications.
2 Certainly, no such proviso was suggested by Fuller himself.
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A Fuller-type case itself shows our readiness to attribute determinate
legal meaning in the face of apparent public policy failure: If we really did
think that, in enacting Fuller’s byelaw, the legislature’s intention was to
prohibit mere loss of consciousness, we would surely consider the tramp
innocent and the businessman guilty. We might well think that legislators
would not have adopted the provision had they given more attention to
the matter or had been better informed as to its likely consequences. But
that thought does not affect our intuitions about the legally correct out-
comes. This suggests that our legal intuitions would always favour the
outcome entailed by what the legislature actually said over any entailed by
what it would have said on greater reflection. “Fuller-proofing” legal
intentionalism is thus unnecessary. The theory faces challenges, but the
Fuller-type case is not among them.
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